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Abstract
It is well-known that mechanism design literature makes many simplifying infor-
mational assumptions in particular in terms of common knowledge of the environment
among players. In this paper, we introduce a notion of continuous implementation and
characterize when a social choice function is continuously implementable. More specif-
ically, we say that a social choice function is continuously (partially) implementable
if it is (partially) implementable for types in the model under study and it continues
to be (partially) implementable for types "close" to this initial model. We ￿rst show
that if the model is of complete information a social choice function is continuously
(partially) implementable only if it satis￿es Maskin￿ s monotonicity. We then extend
this result to general incomplete information settings and show that a social choice
function is continuously (partially) implementable only if it is fully implementable in
iterative dominance. For ￿nite mechanisms, this condition is also su¢ cient. We also
discuss implications of this characterization for the virtual implementation approach.
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11 Introduction
The notion of partial ￿as opposed to full ￿implementation consists in designing games
under which some equilibrium ￿but not necessarily all ￿yields the outcome desired by the
social planner. Despite the fact that undesirable equilibria may potentially exist, partial
implementation is widely used both in theoretical and applied works. One of the main
reasons for its success is the celebrated revelation principle: if the desired outcomes can
arise as an equilibrium in some mechanism, then it will arise in a truth-telling equilibrium
of the direct mechanism. It is then informally argued that truth-telling is a focal point and
that agents should coordinate on this equilibrium when it exists. If the social planner is
not perfectly sure that the information structure of the model he has in mind corresponds
exactly to the true situation, the very notion of truth-telling strategy becomes problematic.
Nevertheless, the focal point argument used to defend the partial approach extends to this
(more realistic) context: if an agent￿ s type t is very "close" to a type ￿ t of the initial model,
then reporting the message that corresponds to type ￿ t may reasonably be seen as a focal
point for type t.
Following this line of thought and taking into account the doubts a social planer may
have about his model, we characterize when a social choice function can be partially con-
tinuously implemented. More speci￿cally, we require that in any perturbation of the initial
model, there exists an equilibrium that yields the desired outcome, not only at all types of
the initial model but also at all types "close" to initial types. Our main results state that
this continuity requirement leads to necessary (and su¢ cient) conditions that are tightly
linked to full implementation. Otherwise stated, this paper shows that the partial imple-
mentation paradigm is very fragile when slight modi￿cations of the information structures
are allowed.
In a ￿rst step, we focus on the simple case in which the initial model is of complete
information. In this speci￿c setting, widely used in mechanism design, the approach of
partial implementation is very permissive. For instance, when there are at least three
agents, any social choice function can be partially implemented1. Let us be more speci￿c
and describe our continuity requirement in this setting. A pro￿le of complete information
types may be seen as a pro￿le of degenerate hierarchies of beliefs where every player
knows the realized state of nature, every player knows that everyone knows and so on...
Put in another way, the modeler studies a set of (degenerate) hierarchies of beliefs where
1The mechanism allowing such a permissive result is direct. Just assume that whenever at least n ￿ 1
players out of n send the same state of nature, the mechanism assigns the outcome desired by the planer
at this state. In any other case, the mechanism assigns some arbitrary outcome.
2some given state of nature is commonly known. In our setting, a pro￿le of incomplete
information types t is considered to be close to a pro￿le t￿ of complete information types
(where it is common knowledge that the real state of nature is ￿) if, t induces hierarchies of
beliefs where each player believes with a high probability that payo⁄s are given by ￿; each
player believes with a high probability that each player believes with a high probability
that payo⁄s are given by ￿; etc... up to high but ￿nite order. In our ￿rst result, we show
that a social choice function is continuously implementable only if it satis￿es Maskin￿ s
monotonicity. Many social choice functions are not monotonic and hence not continuously
implementable. Since Maskin￿ s monotonicity is necessary and (almost) su¢ cient for full
Nash implementation in complete information settings (Maskin (1999)), this result builds
a ￿rst bridge between partial and full implementation. In other words, a lack of full
implementation can be problematic even if the social planer is only willing to partially
implement the social choice function.
Our continuity requirement naturally extends to the case where the initial model is
of incomplete information. To formalize this, we use the method introduced by Harsanyi
(1967) and developed in Mertens and Zamir (1985). Each type in the initial model is
mapped into a hierarchy of beliefs. Then, following the interim approach due to Weinstein
and Yildiz (2007), we de￿ne a notion of ￿nearby￿ types. As already underlined in the
complete information setting, this notion, formally described by the product topology in
the universal type space, captures the restrictions on the modeler￿ s ability to observe the
players￿(high order) beliefs. In this general setting, we provide our main result: if a social
choice function is continuously implementable, then it must also be fully implementable
in rationalizable messages. More precisely, we show that if some mechanism continuously
implements a social choice function f, then we can extract from the initial mechanism a
"smaller" mechanism that fully implements f in rationalizable messages. For ￿nite mech-
anisms, this condition is also su¢ cient2. Borgers (1995) shows that full implementation in
rationalizable messages is a demanding notion when considering large preference domains.
However, under complete information, Bergemann and Morris (2009a) establishes a tight
connection between this notion and full implementation in Nash equilibrium. Bergemann
and Morris (2009b,c) provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for full implementation
in rationalizable messages while Bergemann and Morris (2007) studies an application to
ascending auctions.
Virtual implementation corresponds to the requirement that the outcomes speci￿ed by
the social choice function arise with probability arbitrarily close to ￿ but not necessarily
2As will be discussed further, for in￿nite mechanisms, the existence of an equilibrium is not ensured
and so this condition need not be su¢ cient.
3equal to￿one. Moving to virtual implementation may be seen as natural when considering
continuity requirements. A corollary of our main result states that a social choice function
is continuously virtually (partially) implementable with ￿nite mechanisms if and only if
it is virtually (fully) implementable in rationalizable messages with ￿nite mechanisms.
While apparently similar to our main result, this characterization is actually much less
demanding. Indeed, under virtual implementation, very permissive su¢ cient conditions
have been established by Abreu and Matsushima (1992a,b) for the solution concept of
rationalizability. More precisely, in complete information settings, Abreu and Matsushima
(1992a) shows that under very weak domain restrictions, if there are more than three
players, any social choice function is virtually implementable in rationalizable messages.
Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) extends this result to incomplete information: they show
that Bayesian Incentive Compatibility and a measurability condition, which seems weak
and generically satis￿ed3, are both necessary and su¢ cient. In other terms, under the
virtual approach, the gap between partial implementation (which is equivalent to Bayesian
Incentive Compatibility) and full implementation in rationalizable messages is quite small.
Since mechanisms used in this literature are ￿nite, this means that when moving to virtual
implementation, our continuity requirement leads to much less severe restrictions than for
exact implementation. We interpret this result as a new argument in favor of the virtual
approach: even if the social planer is only interested in partial implementation, considering
Abreu and Matsushima￿ s mechanisms makes sense.
Since the seminal paper by Rubinstein (1989) on the e-mail game, several approaches
have been followed to analyze the connection between high order beliefs and strategic
behavior; the so-called notion of robustness due to Kajii and Morris (1997), the global
games argument due to Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) and the interim approach due
to Weinstein and Yildiz (2007). These works share the common assumption that in the
perturbed models, some types may have preferences that are radically di⁄erent from those
of types in the initial model4. Indeed, the behavior of these speci￿c types is used as a
starting point for contagion processes that drive results in these analyses. Note that the
meaning of such an assumption in the mechanism design context (where the social planer
￿xes the game form) would be problematic. However, in the present paper, we show that
the logic of implementation makes this assumption unnecessary. Indeed, in mechanism
design, several di⁄erent states of natures are ex ante possible for the social planer. Our
3For instance, as noted in Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) or Bergemann and Morris (2009d), a simple
su¢ cient condition for all social choice functions to satisfy the measurability condition, is type diversity:
every type has distinct preferences over lotteries unconditional on others￿types.
4This corresponds to the notion of "crazy types" in the robustness approach and to that of "dominance
regions" in global games or the interim approach.
4argument in the proof uses this multiplicity and shows that this setting is then rich enough:
partial implementation in the initial model is used as an (endogenous) starting point for
the contagion process at equilibrium. It is then enough to assume that sending a message
may involve an (arbitrarily) small cost. Since in many real economic situations sending
a message is costly5, this technical assumption6 is in the spirit of our local requirements:
mechanisms that are not robust to an arbitrarily small departure from the assumption of
costless messages are rather undesirable.
Our results also contribute to the literature on the so-called "Wilson doctrine"7. Berge-
mann and Morris (2005) is one of the ￿rst attempts to relax the implicit common knowl-
edge assumptions made in the mechanism design literature.8 In their setting, the modeler
when choosing a mechanism has no information on the real situation that will ￿nally pre-
vail among the agents9. Consequently, their notion of robust implementation follows a
"global approach": a social choice function10 is robustly (partially) implementable if it is
(partially) implementable on all possible models. They show that a social choice function
is robustly implementable if and only if it is ex-post implementable11. On the contrary,
we assume that the planer has some speci￿c model in mind and is quite con￿dent about
it. As a consequence, our requirement is only local: the social choice function must be
implemented only at types ￿close￿to types in the initial model. This is the reason why
5For instance, sending a message in real life situations may consist in ￿lling in a questionnaire which
is time-consuming and hence costly. It may sometimes require to present costly physical proofs such as
observable characteristics of products, endowments... See Bull and Watson (2007) or Kartik and Tercieux
(2009) for details.
6In case a player has several best responses against some belief, this assumption allows us to build a
small perturbation of the environment where this player has a unique best response.
7Wilson (1987) writes "I foresee the progress of game theory as depending on successive reductions in
the base of common knowledge required to conduct useful analyses of practical problems. Only by repeated
weakening of common knowledge assumptions will the theory approximate reality".
8Another related paper is Chung and Ely (2001). They study full implementation in undominated
Nash equilibrium. They show that (under hedonic preferences), while almost all social choice functions are
fully implementable in undominated Nash equilibrium, only monotonic social choice functions can be fully
implemented in undominated Nash if we also require that no discontinuity occurs at complete information
information. There are two main di⁄erences with our work: ￿rst we focus on partial implementation,
second the topology behind their continuity requirement is di⁄erent from ours. See Kunimoto (2008) for
additional details on their underlying topology.
9Alternatively, Artemov, Kunimoto and Serrano (2007) consider that the planer knows the (￿nite set
of) ￿rst-order beliefs of the agents.
10Bergemann and Morris (2005) also consider social choice correspondences.
11Ex-post implementation requires that each agent￿ s strategy be optimal for every possible realization of
the types of other agents. The possibility of ex-post implementation has been recently studied (see Jehiel
et al (2006) and Bikhchandani (2006)).
5ex-post implementation is not necessary in our setting.12
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyses the complete information case. In
Section 3, we extend our notion of continuous implementation to incomplete information
and give our main result. We conclude with a discussion of further issues in Section 4.
2 Complete Information Case
We ￿rst introduce the complete information setting and the notion of implementation un-
der complete information. Then, we de￿ne our main notion of continuous implementation.
2.1 Complete Information Implementation
We consider a ￿nite set of players I = f1;:::;Ig: Each agent i has a bounded utility
function ui : A ￿ ￿ ! R where ￿ is the ￿nite13 set of states of nature and A is the set
of outcomes endowed with an arbitrary topology. A social choice function is a mapping
f : ￿ ! A.14 If the true state of nature is ￿;the planner would like the outcome to be f(￿):
A mechanism speci￿es a message set Mi for each agent i and a mapping g from message
pro￿les to outcomes. More precisely, we write M as an abbreviation for
Q
i2I Mi and for
each player i, M￿i for
Q
j6=i Mj.15 A mechanism M is a pair (M;g) where the outcome
function g : M ! A assigns to each message pro￿le m an alternative g(m) 2 A. In what
follows, we assume that message spaces are countable.16 By a slight abuse of notations,
we will sometimes note m for the degenerate distribution in ￿(M) assigning probability
1 to m.
For each ￿ 2 ￿; a mechanism M = (M;g) induces a complete information game
￿(M;￿) = [I;fMigi2I;fui(g(:);￿)gi2I] where each agent i￿ s payo⁄ when message pro￿le
m is sent is ui(g(m);￿). We also denote the set of pure Nash equilibria in ￿(M;￿) by
12It is not su¢ cient either. This is due to the fact that Bergemann and Morris (2005) use the so-called
"known own payo⁄ type" universal type space. To be more speci￿c, they de￿ne the set of states of nature
￿ by ￿ = ￿i2I￿i where ￿i is the set of player i￿ s payo⁄ types. Then, they assume that there is common
knowledge that each player i knows his payo⁄ type ￿i.
13The ￿niteness assumption is used to prove our main result (Theorem 2) but is not needed to establish
the necessity of Maskin monotonicity (Theorem 1).
14In the paper, we restrict our attention to social choice function for simplicity. Extensions to social
choice correspondences will be discussed further.
15Similar abbreviations will be used throughout the paper for analogous objects.
16As will become clear, this assumption will allow us to prove our necessary conditions for continuous
implementation using only models with a countable set of types. When moving to su¢ cient conditions,
having models with countable set of types will be useful to apply standard existence theorems; see footnote
16.
6NE(M;￿) = fm 2 M : for each i, ui(g(mi;m￿i);￿) ￿ ui(g(m0
i;m￿i);￿) for all m0
i 2
Mig. Implementation literature (in particular partial implementation) often focuses on
the equilibrium concept of pure (and not mixed) Nash. We recall the de￿nitions of partial
and full implementation under complete information.
De￿nition 1 A social choice function f : ￿ ! A is partially implementable if there exists
a mechanism M such that for each ￿; there exists m￿ 2 NE(M;￿) such that g(m￿) = f(￿).
De￿nition 2 A social choice function f : ￿ ! A is fully implementable if there exists a
mechanism M such that for each ￿; NE(M;￿) 6= ; and for any m￿ 2 NE(M;￿) we have:
g(m￿) = f(￿).
2.2 Continuous Implementation
To de￿ne our notion of continuous implementation,we embed the complete information
setting in a richer setting that allows to perturb high order beliefs. We also relax the
assumption that sending a message is perfectly costless.
Small costs of messages
We assume that sending a message may be slightly costly. Indeed, sending a message
usually requires to ￿ll in a questionnaire, to write a letter and sometimes to present
costly physical proofs such as observable characteristics of goods, endowments... A recent
literature in implementation takes into account costs of messages17. We believe that a
mechanism implementing a social choice function should still implement it when we allow
for slight departures from the assumption of costless messages. In order to formalize this
idea, we proceed as follows.
Given a mechanism M = (M;g), for each player i, we de￿ne a cost function ci :
Mi ￿ ~ ￿ ! R+ where ~ ￿ is the space of states of nature associated with costs of messages.







mig [ f~ ￿
0
g
where for each player i and each message mi; we have ci(mi;~ ￿
0




mi) = ￿ for all m0
i 6= mi; where ￿ is a strictly positive parameter that can be
chosen arbitrarily close to 0. When no confusion arises, we will omit the dependence with
respect to ￿. Note that since M has been assumed to be countable, ~ ￿ is also countable.
Next, we write ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ for the extended set of states of nature. For a given state of
17See for instance Bull and Watson (2007), Deneckere and Severinov (2008), Matsushima (2008) and
Kartik and Tercieux (2009).
7nature ￿￿ = (￿;~ ￿) 2 ￿￿; the utility function of player i for a given message mi and a given




Technically, the above construction is used to break ties. More precisely, if a type is
indi⁄erent between several messages, we can slightly perturb his information so that this
type has a unique best reply. Our basic point is that we want to allow a rich enough
uncertainty such that for each message there exists a state of nature where the cost of this
message is smaller than the other messages￿costs. Note that this assumption is reminiscent
of the richness assumption assumed in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007). However, it is much
weaker. Indeed, the richness assumption states that for any player i and any message mi,
there exists a state nature where mi is strictly dominant for player i.
Models
There are two main classes of situations with incomplete information. The ￿rst one
consists in situations with an ex ante stage during which each player observes a private
signal about the payo⁄s, and the joint distribution of signals and payo⁄s is commonly
known. These situations are naturally modelled using a standard type space. The sec-
ond class, on which we focus in this paper, consists in genuine situations of incomplete
information, i.e. situations with no ex ante stage: each player begins with a hierarchy of
beliefs. We follow the standard Harsanyi (1967)￿ s approach and model these hierarchies of
beliefs by introducing a hypothetical ex ante stage leading to a standard type space. This
allows us to study strategic behavior of players at types that are considered to be close to
a given original model.
A model T is a pair (T;￿) where T = T1 ￿ ::: ￿ TI is a countable18 type space and
￿ti 2 ￿(￿￿ ￿ T￿i) denotes the associated beliefs for each ti 2 Ti. Given a mechanism M
and a model T ; we write U(M;T ) for the induced incomplete information game. In this
game, a (behavioral) strategy of a player i is any measurable function ￿i : Ti ! ￿(Mi):
We will note ￿i(mi j ti) for the probability that strategy ￿i assigns to message mi when
player i is of type ti. For each i 2 I and for each belief ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿ ￿ M￿i); set






ui(g(mi;m￿i);￿) ￿ ci(mi;~ ￿)
i
:
Given any type ti and any strategy pro￿le ￿￿i, we write ￿i(￿ j ti;￿￿i) 2 ￿(￿￿ ￿ M￿i)
for the joint distribution on the underlying uncertainty and the other players￿messages
induced by ti and ￿￿i.
18This assumption is just made to ensure existence of Bayes Nash equilibrium in ￿nite games which will
turn out to be useful when we deal with su¢ cient conditions for continuous implementation.
8De￿nition 3 A pro￿le of strategies ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿I) is a Bayes Nash equilibrium in
U(M;T ) if for each i 2 I and for each ti 2 Ti;
mi 2 Supp(￿i(ti)) ) mi 2 BRi(￿i(￿ j ti;￿￿i) j M).
As speci￿ed earlier, types close to complete information are types where it is mutually
believed (with arbitrarily large probability) up to an arbitrarily large order that a given
complete information situation occurred. More formally, given a model (T;￿) and any
















for each measurable F ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿(￿￿)I: We can compute an entire hierarchy of beliefs




i (ti);:::) where h1
i(ti) 2 ￿(￿￿) is a probability distribution
on ￿￿; representing the beliefs of i about ￿￿; h2
i(ti) 2 ￿(￿￿ ￿ ￿(￿￿)I) is a probability
distribution representing the beliefs of i about ￿￿ and the other ￿rst order beliefs. Let us
write hi(ti) for the resulting hierarchy and hk
i (ti) for the kth-order beliefs of type ti.
The set of all belief hierarchies for which it is common knowledge that the beliefs
are coherent (i.e., each player knows his beliefs and his beliefs at di⁄erent orders are
consistent with each other) is the universal type space (see Mertens and Zamir (1985) and
Brandenburger and Dekel (1993)). We denote by T ￿
i the set of player i0s hierarchies of





In our formulation, two types t and ￿ t are ￿close￿if there exists a su¢ ciently ￿large￿
k such that for each l ￿ k; the lth-order beliefs hl(t) and hl(￿ t) are close in the topology
of convergence of measures. To be more precise, each T ￿
i is endowed with the prod-
uct topology, so that a sequence of types fti[n]g1
n=0 converges to a type ti; if, for each
k : hk
i (ti[n]) ! hk
i (ti) (i.e. hk
i (ti[n]) converges toward hk
i (ti) in the topology of weak con-
vergence of measures19). In such a case, we write ti[n] !P ti. We will sometimes use the




i (ti[n]) 2 ￿(Xk￿1) where X0 = ￿
￿ and Xk = [￿(Xk￿1)]
I ￿ Xk￿1.
20I.e. on ￿(Xk￿1) ￿see the previous footnote. One such metric is the Prokhorov metric; see Section
4.2.
9We now introduce our main notion of continuous implementation. We ￿rst de￿ne the





and ￿ti;￿ = ￿
(￿;~ ￿
0
;t￿i;￿) where ￿x denotes the probability distribution that puts probability 1
on fxg. It is easily checked that hi(ti;￿) is the hierarchy of player i￿ s beliefs corresponding to
common knowledge21 of (￿;~ ￿
0
). We will henceforth call the type ti;￿ a complete information
type.
The modeler is interested in strategic behavior of types where players mutually believe
(with high probability) up to a high (but ￿nite) level that the state of nature is some ￿ 2 ￿.
Our continuity requirement will ensure that the social choice function is implemented not
only at complete information types but also at types that are so close to the complete
information situation that they cannot be ruled out by the modeler.
In what follows, for two models T = (T;￿) and T 0 = (T0;￿0) we will note T ￿ T 0 if
T ￿ T0 and for all i;ti 2 T0
i : ￿ti = ￿0
ti.
De￿nition 4 Fix a mechanism M and a model T ￿ T CI. We say that an equilibrium ￿
in U(M;T ) continuously implements f if for each t￿ 2 TCI, (i) ￿(t￿) is pure and (ii) for
any sequence t[n] !P t￿ where for each n : t[n] 2 T; we have g ￿ ￿(t[n]) ! f(￿).
Notice that point (i) maintains the requirement of pure strategy behavior usually
assumed in implementation theory; this will allow for simple comparisons with existing
results22. We now state a formal de￿nition of continuous implementation.
De￿nition 5 A social choice function f : ￿ ! A is continuously implementable if there
exists a mechanism M, such that for any model T ￿ T CI, there is a Bayes Nash equilib-
rium ￿ in the induced game U(M;T ) which continuously implements f.
2.3 Monotonicity as a Necessary Condition
In this section, we show that any social choice function that is continuously implementable
satis￿es the well-known monotonicity condition as de￿ned in Maskin (1999). This result,
which is a ￿rst step toward our main result, reduces the gap between partial and full
implementation since ￿as proved by Maskin ￿this monotonicity condition is necessary
and "almost" su¢ cient for full implementation23.
Let us ￿rst recall the de￿nition of monotonicity for social choice functions.
21In this paper, we do not distinguish common knowledge and common belief.
22This assumption is dispensible for our main result (Theorem 2). In addition, provided that the
de￿nition of monotonicity is extended to lotteries, Theorem 1 also extends.
23Maskin (1999) showed that with more than three players together with the assumption that f satis￿es
the weak condition of No Veto Power, monotonicity actually implies full implementation.
10De￿nition 6 A social choice function f is monotonic if for every pair of states ￿ and ￿0
such that for each player i and for each a 2 A;
ui(a;￿) ￿ ui(f(￿);￿) ) ui(a;￿0) ￿ ui(f(￿);￿0); (?)
we have f(￿) = f(￿0):
We now state the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 1 A social choice function is continuously implementable only if it is monotonic.
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume that there exists a mechanism M = (M;g) that
continuously implements f: Pick ￿;￿0 2 ￿ such that for each player i and for each a 2 A;
the relation (?) is satis￿ed. We want to show that f(￿) = f(￿0).
We show that there exists a model T = (T;￿) such that for any equilibrium ￿ that
continuously implements f, there is a sequence of types ft[n]g1
n=1 in T such that t[n] !P t￿0
and g ￿ ￿(t[n]) ! f(￿). By point (ii) of De￿nition 4: g ￿ ￿(t[n]) ! f(￿0); which implies
f(￿) = f(￿0).











where ti(k;m) and ￿ are de￿ned recursively as follows. For each m = (m1;:::;mI) 2 M :






In addition, for each k ￿ 2; ti(k;m) is de￿ned by




) = 1 ￿
1
k






Observe that since M has been assumed to be countable, each Ti is countable, and so is
T.
11Now pick any equilibrium ￿ of the induced game U(M;T ) that continuously imple-
ments f. By point (i) in De￿nition 4; ￿(t￿) is a pure Nash equilibrium in the complete infor-
mation game ￿(M;￿). In addition, point (ii) in De￿nition 4 implies that g￿￿(t￿) = f(￿).
In the sequel, we note m￿
i := ￿i(ti;￿) and m￿ := ￿(t￿). We have for any player i and
m0
































￿i) j M); and since ￿ is an equilibrium:
￿i(ti(1;m￿)) = m￿
i.
Using a similar reasoning, it is easy to show inductively that for all k ￿ 2
￿i(ti(k;m￿)) = m￿
i.
This means that for each k ￿ 1; g ￿ ￿(t(k;m￿)) = g(m￿) = f(￿) and so obviously, g ￿
￿(t(k;m￿)) ! f(￿) (as k ! 1) which completes the proof since t(k;m￿) !P t￿0 (as
k ! 1).
One may think that our strong result stems from lack of a common prior in the model
we build. However, it is possible to slightly perturb the conditional beliefs of types in our
model so that using an argument due to Lipman (2003, 2005), these types could be picked
from models where players share a common prior.
Our paper focuses on social choice functions; for social choice correspondences, two
de￿nitions of partial implementation coexist. To be more speci￿c, in the ￿rst de￿nition,
which is "weak", a social choice correspondence F : ￿ ￿ A is partially implementable if
there exists a mechanism M and a selection f of F such that the mechanism M partially
implements f. In the second de￿nition, which is "strong", a social choice correspondence
F : ￿ ￿ A is partially implementable if there exists a mechanism M that partially
implements each selection f of F. Maskin (1999) gives a de￿nition of Maskin monotonicity
12for social choice correspondences24 and shows that under the same conditions as for social
choice functions, this notion implies "strong" full implementation, i.e. that there exists
a mechanism M such that for each ￿ : F(￿) = g(NE(M;￿)); note that the mechanism
M partially implements each selection of F. Using a "strong" de￿nition of continuous
partial implementation, Theorem 1 can easily be extended to social choice correspondences.
It is clear that if a mechanism continuously implements a social choice function, then
it must partially implement in NE this social choice function. If we add the requirement
that it must partially implement in strict NE, then we may dispense with the assumption
on cost of messages. In this case, a necessary condition would be the strict monotonicity
condition (i.e. where the inequalities in the de￿nition of monotonicity are replaced by
strict inequalities).
3 Incomplete Information
So far, we focused our attention on situations where the planer has a complete information
setting in mind. We now relax this assumption and consider the general case where the
initial model of the planer is (potentially) an incomplete information one. As before, the
modeler wants to see how strategic behavior is a⁄ected under his mechanism when the
assumption that his model is common knowledge is relaxed. We now move to our main re-
sult which establishes a tight connection between our notion of continuous implementation
and full implementation in rationalizable messages.
3.1 De￿nitions
We ￿rst extend the de￿nition of continuous implementation to an incomplete information
setting. In the sequel, we ￿x a ￿nite25 model ￿ T = (￿ T; ￿ ￿) which is the model the planer
has in mind.
De￿nition 7 Fix a mechanism M and a model T ￿ ￿ T , we say that an equilibrium ￿ in
U(M;T ) continuously implements f if for each ￿ t 2 ￿ T, (i) ￿(￿ t) is pure and (ii) for any
sequence t[n] !P ￿ t where for each n : t[n] 2 T; we have g ￿ ￿(t[n]) ! f(￿ t).
24A social choice correspondence is monotonic if for all ￿; b 2 F(￿) and any ￿
0 such that for each player
i and a 2 A
ui(a;￿) ￿ ui(b;￿) ) ui(a;￿
0) ￿ ui(b;￿
0)
we have b 2 F(￿
0).
25The ￿niteness assumption allows to prove Theorem 2 using only models that are countable which again
will be useful when moving to su¢ ciency results.
13De￿nition 8 A social choice function f : ￿ T ! A is continuously implementable if there
exists a mechanism M, such that for each model T ￿ ￿ T , there is a Bayes Nash equilibrium
￿ in the induced game U(M;T ) which continuously implements f.
3.2 Necessary Condition
Our characterization result relies on the notion of full implementation in rationalizable
messages. First, let us recall the de￿nition of (interim correlated) rationalizability given
in Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2006, 2007). Pick any pro￿le of types t drawn from some
arbitrary model T = (T;￿). For each i and ti; set R0
i(ti j M;T ) = Mi; and de￿ne for any
integer k > 0 the sets Rk
i (ti j M;T ) iteratively, by
Rk










mi 2 BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i￿i j M) for some ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿ ￿ T￿i ￿ M￿i)
where marg￿￿￿T￿i￿i = ￿ti and
￿i(￿￿;t￿i;m￿i) > 0 =) m￿i 2 Rk￿1






￿i (t￿i j M;T ) stands for
Q
j6=i Rk￿1
j (tj j M;T ). The set of all rationalizable
messages for player i(with type ti) is
R1








i (ti j M;T ).
Remark 1 Lipman (1994) gives an alternative de￿nition of rationalizability for the case
of countable action sets. While his de￿nition is consistent with common knowledge of
rationality, the one we use in this paper is a coarser solution concept. Using a coarser
solution concept strengthens our necessary condition; this condition will remain valid un-
der any ￿ner notion of rationalizability. Our su¢ ciency results will be proved for ￿nite
mechanisms where both concepts coincide.
We say that a social choice function is fully implementable in rationalizable messages,
or simply fully rationalizable implementable, if there is a mechanism M so that at each
pro￿le of types ￿ t 2 ￿ T : m 2 R1(￿ t j M; ￿ T ) ) g(m) = f(￿ t). In the sequel, for two
mechanisms M = (M;g) and M0 = (M0;g0), we write M0 ￿ M if M0 ￿ M and gjM0 = g0
where gjM0 denotes the restriction of g to M0.
Our main theorem is stated as follows.
Theorem 2 A social choice function f : ￿ T ! A is continuously implementable with a
mechanism M only if it is fully rationalizable implementable by some mechanism M0 ￿ M.
The above result states a necessary condition for continuous implementation. When
moving to su¢ ciency, existence of equilibria becomes an issue. Given that the set of
14messages may be in￿nite, there may exist models where no equilibrium exists even if f is
fully rationalizable implementable (in the model ￿ T ). However, this condition will turn to
be su¢ cient when considering ￿nite mechanisms.
Note that if f is continuously implementable, then it is partially implementable. Hence,
the previous result shows that full implementation in (Bayes) Nash equilibrium is a nec-
essary condition for continuous implementation. Jackson (1991) has extended Maskin￿ s
monotonicity to incomplete information settings. He de￿nes Bayesian monotonicity and
shows that this notion is a necessary condition for full implementation in Nash equilibria
in incomplete information settings. Hence, as a corollary of the above result, we get that
Bayesian monotonicity is also necessary for continuous implementation which generalizes
our Theorem 1.26
Finally, using the "weak" de￿nition of partial implementation for social choice corre-
spondences given in Section 2.3, it is possible to extend Theorem 2 and to establish that
a necessary condition for F to be (weakly) continuously implementable is that F must be
(weakly) fully implementable in rationalizable messages (i.e. there is a mechanism M and
a selection f of F such that M full implements f in rationalizable messages.)27
Let us move now to the proof of Theorem 2. Since f is continuously implementable,
there exists a mechanism M = (M;g), such that for any model T = (T;￿), there is a Bayes
Nash equilibrium ￿ in the induced game U(M;T ) where for each ￿ t 2 ￿ T, (i) ￿(￿ t) is pure
and (ii) for any sequence t[n] !P ￿ t where for each n : t[n] 2 T; we have g￿￿(t[n]) ! f(￿ t).
We let ￿ ￿ be the set of pure Bayesian Nash equilibria of U(M; ￿ T ). Note that because ￿ T is
￿nite and M is countable, ￿ ￿ is countable. For each ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿; we build the set of message
pro￿les M(￿ ￿) in the following way.
For each player i and each positive integer k, we de￿ne inductively Mk
i (￿ ￿). First, we
set M0
i (￿ ￿) = ￿ ￿i(￿ Ti). Then, for each k ￿ 1 :
Mk+1
i (￿ ￿) = BRi(￿(￿ ￿ f~ ￿
0
g ￿ Mk
￿i(￿ ￿)) j M):
Recall that in the model ￿ T = (￿ T; ￿ ￿); marg~ ￿￿ ￿￿ ti(~ ￿
0
) = 1, for each i and ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti. Since ￿ ￿
is an equilibrium in U(M; ￿ T ), M0
i (￿ ￿) = ￿ ￿i(￿ Ti) ￿ BRi(￿(￿ ￿ f~ ￿
0
g ￿ M0
￿i(￿ ￿)) j M) =
M1
i (￿ ￿). Consequently, it is clear that for each k : Mk
i (￿ ￿) ￿ Mk+1
i (￿ ￿). Finally, set
Mi(￿ ￿) = limk!1 Mk




i (￿ ￿). In the sequel, for each ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿, we will note M(￿ ￿)
the mechanism (M(￿ ￿);gjM(￿ ￿)).
26Bergemann and Morris (2009b) de￿ne the notion of interim rationalizable monotonicity which is
necessary for full rationalizable implementation. Clearly, Theorem 1 implies that interim rationalizable
monotonicity is necessary for continuous implementation.
27For continuous "strong" partial implementation, we believe that Bayesian monotonicity as de￿ned by
Jackson (1991) is necessary.
15Notice that given any model T = (T;￿) such that T ￿ ￿ T , ￿ T is a belief closed subspace
in T , i.e., for any i and ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti : margT￿i ￿￿ ti(￿ T￿i) = 1. Hence, for any model T ￿ ￿ T and
any equilibrium ￿ in U(M;T ); the restriction of ￿ to ￿ T ￿denoted ￿j ￿ T ￿is an equilibrium
in U(M; ￿ T ). A ￿rst interesting property of the family of sets fM(￿ ￿)g￿ ￿2￿ ￿ is as follows:
there is a model T ￿ ￿ T for which any equilibrium ￿ in U(M;T ) has full range in M(￿j ￿ T)
i.e. each message pro￿le in M(￿j ￿ T) is played under ￿ at some pro￿le of types in the model
T . More precisely, Proposition 1 is the ￿rst step of the proof of Theorem 2.
Proposition 1 There exists a model T =(T;￿) such that for any ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ and m 2 M(￿ ￿),
there exists t[￿ ￿;m] 2 T s.t. ￿(t[￿ ￿;m]) = m for any equilibrium ￿ in U(M;T ) s.t. ￿j ￿ T = ￿ ￿.
Proof. We build the model T =(T;￿) as follows. For each equilibrium ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿, player
i and integer k , we de￿ne inductively ti[￿ ￿;k;mi] for each mi 2 Mk









ti[￿ ￿;k;mi] [ ￿ Ti
Note that Ti is countable. In the sequel, we ￿x an arbitrary ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿. This equilibrium ￿ ￿ is
sometimes omitted in our notations.
For each k ￿ 1 and mi 2 Mk
i (￿ ￿), we know that there exists ￿
k;mi




￿i (￿ ￿)) such that mi 2 BRi(￿
k;mi
i ). Thus we can build ^ ￿
k;mi




￿i (￿ ￿) ^ ￿
k;mi
i = marg￿￿Mk￿1
￿i (￿ ￿) ￿
k;mi
i
while marg~ ￿^ ￿
k;mi
i = ￿~ ￿
mi. Note that BRi(^ ￿
k;mi
i j M) = fmig.
In the sequel, for each player i and mi 2 M0
i (￿ ￿), we pick one type denoted ti[￿ ￿;0;mi] in
￿ Ti satisfying ￿ ￿i(ti[￿ ￿;0;mi]) = mi. This is well-de￿ned because by construction, M0
i (￿ ￿) =
￿ ￿i(￿ Ti). Now, for each mi 2 M1
i (￿ ￿), we let ti[￿ ￿;1;mi] be de￿ned by28
￿ti[￿ ￿;1;mi](￿;~ ￿;t￿i) =
(




i (￿;~ ￿;m￿i) if t￿i = t￿i[￿ ￿;0;m￿i] for some m￿i 2 M0
￿i(￿ ￿)
.
This probability measure is well-de￿ned since ^ ￿
1;mi
i (￿ ￿ ~ ￿ ￿ M0
￿i(￿ ￿)) = 1. In the same
way, for each k > 1 and mi 2 Mk
i (￿ ￿), we de￿ne inductively ti[￿ ￿;k;mi] by:
￿ti[￿ ￿;k;mi](￿;~ ￿;t￿i) =
(




i (￿;~ ￿;m￿i) if t￿i = t￿i[￿ ￿;k ￿ 1;m￿i] for some m￿i 2 Mk￿1
￿i (￿ ￿)
:
Again, this probability measure is well-de￿ned since ^ ￿
k;mi
i (￿ ￿ ~ ￿ ￿ Mk￿1
￿i (￿ ￿)) = 1.
28Here again, we abuse notations and write t￿i[￿ ￿;0;m￿i] for (tj[￿ ￿;0;mj])j6=i. Similarly, t[￿ ￿;0;m] stands
for (ti[￿ ￿;0;mi])i2I. Similar abuse will be used along this proof.
16To complete the proof, we show that for any equilibrium ￿ of U(M;T ) such that
￿j ￿ T = ￿ ￿, we have:
￿i(ti[￿ ￿;k;mi]) = mi; (1)
for each player i, integer k and message mi 2 Mk
i (￿ ￿): The proof proceeds by induction on
k.
First note that, by construction, of ti[￿ ￿;0;mi], we must have for any equilibrium ￿ of
U(M;T ) such that ￿j ￿ T = ￿ ￿:
￿i(ti[￿ ￿;0;mi]) = mi;
for each player i and message mi 2 M0
i (￿ ￿): Now, assume that Equation (1) is satis￿ed at
rank k ￿ 1 and let us prove it is also satis￿ed at rank k. Fix any mi 2 Mk
i (￿ ￿) and any
equilibrium ￿ of U(M;T ) such that ￿j ￿ T = ￿ ￿. Note that ￿i(ti[￿ ￿;k;mi]) 2 BRi(￿i j M)




￿ti[￿ ￿;k;mi](￿;~ ￿;t￿i)￿￿i(m￿i j t￿i).
In addition, by the inductive hypothesis and the fact that ￿ is an equilibrium of U(M;T )
satisfying ￿j ￿ T = ￿ ￿, we have ￿￿i(m￿i j t￿i[￿ ￿;k ￿ 1;m￿i]) = 1 for any m￿i 2 Mk￿1
￿i (￿ ￿):




￿ti[￿ ￿;k;mi](￿;~ ￿;t￿i)￿￿i(m￿i j t￿i).




We get that ￿i(ti[￿ ￿;k;mi]) 2 BRi(￿i j M) = BRi(^ ￿
mi
i j M) = fmig as claimed.
We now give a ￿rst insight on the second step of the proof of our main result. First
notice that, by construction, each M(￿ ￿) satis￿es the following closure property: taking
any belief ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿f~ ￿
0
g￿M￿i(￿ ￿)) such that BRi(￿i j M) 6= ;, we must have BRi(￿i j
M) ￿ Mi(￿ ￿) and hence, BRi(￿i j M) = BRi(￿i j M(￿ ￿)).
Now pick a type ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and a message mi 2 R1
i(￿ tijM(￿ ￿); ￿ T ), it is possible to
add a type t
mi




i ) is arbitrarily close to h1
i(￿ ti); second, for any equilibrium ￿
with ￿j ￿ T = ￿ ￿, ￿i(t
mi
i ) = mi. Indeed, by de￿nition of R1
i(￿ tijM(￿ ￿); ￿ T ), there exists
a belief ￿
mi
i 2 ￿(￿￿ ￿ T￿i ￿ M￿i(￿ ￿)) where marg￿￿￿
mi
i = marg￿￿￿￿ ti and such that
mi 2 BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i(￿ ￿) ￿
mi
i j M(￿ ￿)). Using our assumption on cost of messages, we
can slightly perturb ￿
mi
i so that mi becomes a unique best reply. So let us assume for sim-
plicity that fmig = BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i(￿ ￿) ￿
mi
i j M(￿ ￿)). Hence, we can de￿ne the type t
mi
i
17that assigns probability marg￿￿￿M￿i(￿ ￿) ￿
mi
i (￿￿;m￿i) to (￿￿;t￿i[￿ ￿;m￿i]) where t￿i[￿ ￿;m￿i]
is de￿ned as in Proposition 1 (i.e. t￿i[￿ ￿;m￿i] plays m￿i under any equilibrium ￿ in
U(M;T ) such that ￿j ￿ T = ￿ ￿). Now pick any equilibrium ￿ in U(M;T ) such that ￿j ￿ T = ￿ ￿.
By construction, Supp(￿i(t
mi
i )) ￿ BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i ￿
mi
i j M) and so BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i(￿ ￿)
￿
mi
i j M) 6= ;. By the closure property described above, BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i ￿
mi
i j M) =
BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i(￿ ￿) ￿
mi
i j M(￿ ￿)) and so we get that type t
mi
i plays mi under the equilib-
rium ￿ and will satisfy the desired property. Using a similar reasoning, we show inductively
the following "contagion" result.
Proposition 2 There exists a model ^ T = (^ T; ^ ￿) such that for each equilibrium ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ and
each player i the following holds. For all ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and mi 2 R1
i (￿ ti j M(￿ ￿); ￿ T ), there exists
a sequence of types f^ ti[n]g1
n=0 in ^ Ti such that (1) ^ ti[n] !P ￿ ti and (2) ￿i(^ ti[n]) = mi for
each equilibrium ￿ of U(M; ^ T ) satisfying ￿j ￿ T = ￿ ￿.
Proof. See Appendix.
We are now in a position to complete the proof of our main Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2. Pick ^ T = (^ T; ^ ￿) as de￿ned in Proposition 2. By de￿nition of
continuous implementation, there exists an equilibrium ￿ in U(M; ^ T ) that continuously
implements f and point (i) in De￿nition 7 ensures that ￿j ￿ T is a pure equilibrium. Now
pick any ￿ t 2 ￿ T and m 2 R1(￿ t j M(￿j ￿ T); ￿ T ), we show that gjM(￿j ￿ T)(m) = f(￿ t) proving
that the mechanism M(￿j ￿ T) full implements f in rationalizable messages.
Applying Proposition 2, we know that there exists a sequence of types f^ t[n]g1
n=0 in
^ T such that (1) ^ t[n] !P ￿ t and (2) ￿(^ t[n]) = m for all n. By (1) and the fact that ￿
continuously implements f, we have g ￿ ￿(^ t[n]) ! f(￿ t) while by (2) we have g ￿ ￿(^ t[n]) =
g(m) for all n. Hence, we must have g(m) = f(￿ t) and so gjM(￿j ￿ T)(m) = f(￿ t) as claimed.
3.3 A Characterization
Our main Theorem provides a necessary condition for continuous implementation. Now,
we show that if we restrict our attention to ￿nite mechanisms, this condition is actually
su¢ cient.
Theorem 3 A social choice function f is continuously implementable by a ￿nite mecha-
nism if and only if it is fully rationalizable implementable by a ￿nite mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 3. The only if part is proved by Theorem 2. Let us prove the if
part. Assume that f : ￿ T ! A is fully rationalizable-implementable by a ￿nite mechanism
M = (M;g) i.e. for all ￿ t 2 ￿ T, m 2 R1(￿ t j M; ￿ T ) =) g(m) = f(￿ t).
18Lemma 1 (Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2006)) Fix any model T = (T;￿) such
that T ￿ ￿ T and any ￿nite mechanism M. (1) For any ￿ t 2 ￿ T and any sequence ft[n]g1
n=0
in T, if t[n] !P ￿ t then, for n large enough, we have R1(t[n] j M;T ) ￿ R1(￿ t j M;T ).
(2) For any type t 2 T : R1(t j M;T ) is non-empty.
Now pick any model T = (T;￿) such that T ￿ ￿ T , we show that there exists an equi-
librium that continuously implements f. Because M is ￿nite and T is countable, standard
arguments show that there exists a Bayes Nash equilibrium in U(M;T ). Pick any se-
quence ft[n]g1
n=0 in T, such that t[n] !P ￿ t. It is clear that for each n : ￿(t[n]) 2
R1(t[n] j M;T ). In addition, for n large enough, we know by Lemma 1 that R1(t[n] j
M;T ) ￿ R1(￿ t j M;T ). Then, for n large enough, ￿(t[n]) 2 R1(￿ t j M;T ) and so
g ￿ ￿(t[n]) 2 g (R1(￿ t j M;T )) = ff(￿ t)g as claimed. ￿
Theorem 3 allows to give a new rationale for the notion of virtual implementation
where ￿nite mechanisms are usually used.
In the sequel, we assume that A is a metric space and note d the associated met-
ric. Given a social choice function f; for each ￿ > 0, we note B￿(f) = ff0 : ￿ T ! A :
d(f0(￿ t);f(￿ t)) < ￿ for all ￿ t 2 ￿ Tg. A social choice function f is said to be partially virtually
implementable by ￿nite mechanisms if for each ￿ > 0; there exists a social choice function
f0 2 B￿(f) that is partially implementable by a ￿nite mechanism (that may depend on ￿).
In the same way, we can extend the de￿nition of continuous implementation.
De￿nition 9 A social choice function f is virtually continuously implementable by ￿nite
mechanisms if for all ￿ > 0, there exists a social choice function f0 2 B￿(f) that is
continuously implementable by a ￿nite mechanism.
We also say that a social choice function f is virtually fully rationalizable imple-
mentable by ￿nite mechanisms if for all ￿ > 0, there exists a social choice function
f0 2 B￿(f) that is fully rationalizable implementable by a ￿nite mechanism. Using Theo-
rem 3 above we can extend our characterization result to virtual implementation.
Proposition 3 A social choice function f is virtually continuously implementable by ￿-
nite mechanisms if and only if it is virtually fully rationalizable implementable by ￿nite
mechanisms.
While the formulations in Proposition 3 and Theorem 3 are similar, their implications
are quite di⁄erent. Indeed, in Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) setting29, Bayesian Incentive
29In this setting, the (￿nite) set of outcomes is extended to the set of lotteries over outcomes and the
natural metric is used over this set.
19Compatibility and a measurability condition are both necessary and su¢ cient for virtual
implementation in rationalizable messages. The measurability condition seems weak and
is generically satis￿ed30. Hence, any social choice function that is partially implementable
(which is equivalent to Bayesian Incentive Compatibility) is virtually implementable in
rationalizable messages. Since mechanisms used in these papers are ￿nite, we know by
Proposition 3 that they also ensures virtual continuous implementation. Hence, we believe
that Proposition 3 provides a new foundation to the approach of virtual implementation
in rationalizable messages.
4 Discussion
4.1 Failure of the Revelation Principle
We present a variant of the well-known Solomon￿ s predicament and establish that the
revelation principle does not hold for continuous implementation.
Each of two agents, 1 and 2, claims an object. There are two payo⁄ types: at ￿1 (resp.
￿2), player 1 (resp. player 2) is the legitimate owner. The set of outcomes is A =
f(x;p1;p2) j x 2 f0;1;2;3g and p1;p2 2 R+g where pi is the level of the ￿ne imposed
on player i and the variable x correspond to the following situations. If x = 0, the object
is not given to either player; if x 2 f1;2g, it is attributed to player x, and if x = 3, both
players are ￿punished￿and the none of them receive the object. The social planner wishes
to give the good to the true owner, i.e. he wants to implement continuously the social
choice function f : f￿1;￿2g ! A for which f(￿1) = (1;0;0) and f(￿2) = (2;0;0). Utility
functions are assumed to be quasi-linear and the object to have a monetary value for each
player. More precisely, this value for player i is vH if he is the legitimate owner of the
object and vL if he is not, with vH > vL > 0. Finally, the punishment outcome (x = 3)
corresponds to a ￿ne fL for player i if he is the legitimate owner and to a ￿ne fH if he is
not, with fH > fL > 0. For instance when the payo⁄type is ￿1; the utility of player 1 when
the outcome is (3;p1;p2) is: u1((3;p1;p2);￿1) = ￿fL ￿ p1 and when outcome (1;p1;p2) is
given: u1((1;p1;p2);￿1) = vH ￿ p1.
The following two claims establish the failure of the revelation principle when a conti-
nuity requirement is taken into account.
Claim 1 f is not continuously implementable with a direct mechanism i.e. a mechanism
M = (M;g) in which for each i 2 f1;2g, Mi = f￿1;￿2g.
30As noted in the introduction, type diversity (which states that every type has distinct preferences over
lotteries unconditional on others￿types) is su¢ cient for all social choice functions to be measurable in the
sense of Abreu and Matsushima (1992b).
20Proof. We establish that no mechanism M0 ￿ M can fully implement in NE the
social choice function f. Theorem 2 completes the proof of Claim 1. Obviously, f cannot
be implemented if the set of message pro￿les is a singleton. Now assume that the set of
message pro￿les is a singleton for one player, say player 1, i.e.
M0
1 = f￿g for some ￿ 2 f￿1;￿2g and M0
2 = f￿1;￿2g. In this case, player 2 must have a
message m2 such that g(m2;￿) = (2;0;0). Then, m2 strictly dominates any message that
yields outcome (1;0;0). Hence, (1;0;0) cannot be an equilibrium outcome at state ￿1.
Finally, we show that the direct mechanism M cannot fully implement in NE the social




2;￿1) 2 NE(M;￿1) and m￿
￿2 = (m￿
1;￿2;m￿
2;￿2) 2 NE(M;￿2) such
that g(m￿
￿1) = f(￿1) and g(m￿
￿2) = f(￿2). It is easily checked that for each player i :
m￿
i;￿1 6= m￿
i;￿2, otherwise, at some state, one player would have an incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium. Now for message pro￿le (m￿
1;￿1;m￿
2;￿2), there is (at least) one player
who does not receive the object. Assume without loss of generality that this is player 1 (a




pure Nash equilibrium at ￿1. Since g(m￿
1;￿2;m￿
2;￿2) = (2;0;0) is the best outcome for player
2, he has no incentive to deviate. We also know by construction that if player 1 deviates,
the outcome is g(m￿
1;￿1;m￿
2;￿2) = (x;p1;p2) where player 1 does not get the object. Hence,
u1(g(m￿
￿2);￿1) = u1((2;0;0);￿1) = 0 ￿ u1((x;p1;p2);￿1) = u1(g(m￿
1;￿2;m￿
2;￿2);￿1) and so
player 1 does not have any incentive to deviate either. Thus f is not fully implementable
by M which completes the proof.
However, as we will show in the following lines, when we expand the set of messages
using indirect mechanisms, f can be continuously implemented.
Claim 2 There exists an indirect mechanism that continuously implements f.
Proof. Consider the following indirect mechanism. Each player has three possible
messages (Mine, His, and Mine+) and the outcome function is given by the matrix below,
where vL < P < vH; fL < p < fH, and ￿ > p.31
Mine His Mine+
Mine (0;￿;￿) (1;0;0) (2;￿;P)
His (2;0;0) (0;￿;￿) (0;p;0)
Mine+ (1;P;￿) (0;0;p) (3;0;0)
At ￿1, action ￿His￿is strictly dominated by ￿Mine+￿ for player 1. Consequently, in
the second round of elimination, ￿Mine￿and ￿Mine+￿are strictly dominated by ￿His￿
31Using the usual convention, player 1 is the row player while player 2 is the column player.
21for player 2 at ￿1. Finally, in the third round, ￿Mine￿is strictly better than ￿Mine+￿for
player 1. Hence, (Mine;His) is the unique rationalizable action pro￿le at ￿1. A symmetric
reasoning applies at ￿2. By Theorem 3, we conclude that this ￿nite indirect mechanism
implements continuously the social choice function f.
4.2 Alternative Topology: Uniform Convergence
In this paper, we de￿ne the notion of continuous implementation using the topology of
point-wise convergence. This topology is standard when working in the universal type
space and has a simple interpretation. However, other topologies are interesting and so
other notions of continuous implementation are worth to be investigated. One natural
candidate is the topology of uniform convergence.32 While interesting in its own right,
we show that all social choice functions that are partially implementable in strict Nash
equilibria with a ￿nite mechanism are continuously implementable under this topology.
This condition is much weaker than the one obtained under the topology of point-wise
convergence. In particular, recall that in complete information settings, under mild con-
ditions33 and with more than three players, any social function is partially implementable
in strict Nash equilibria with a direct mechanism (and so with a ￿nite mechanism in our
setting).
To introduce the topology of uniform convergence, we ￿rst recall the de￿nition of the
Prohorov distance that metrizes the topology of weak convergence of measures. Given a
metric space (X;￿) the Prohorov distance between any two ￿;￿0 2 ￿(X) is
inff￿ > 0 : ￿0(A) ￿ ￿(A￿) + ￿ for every Borel set A ￿ Xg
where A￿ = fx 2 X : infy2A ￿(x;y) < ￿g.
Write X0 = ￿￿ and for each k ￿ 1 : Xk = [￿(Xk￿1)]
I ￿ Xk￿1. Now, let d0
be the discrete metric on ￿￿ and d1 the Prohorov distance on 1st level beliefs ￿(￿￿).
Then, recursively, for any k ￿ 2, let dk be the Prohorov distance on the kth level be-
liefs ￿(Xk￿1) when Xk￿1 is given the product metric induced by d0;d1;:::;dk￿1. We
say that a sequence of types fti[n]g1
n=0 converges uniformly to a type ti, if dU(ti[n];ti) ￿
supk￿1 dk(hk
i (ti[n]);hk
i (ti)) ! 0; in this case we write ti[n] !U ti. We also write t[n] !U t;
if, ti[n] !U ti; for each i 2 I. In this topology, two types are close if they have very sim-
ilar ￿rst-order beliefs, second order-beliefs and so on up to in￿nity where the degree of
32Another topology in the universal type space is the strategic topology as de￿ned in Dekel, Fudenberg
and Morris (2006). Di Tillio and Faingold (2007) established the equivalence between uniform topology
and strategic topology around ￿nite types. Since ￿ T is ￿nite, the result of this section is also true under
the strategic topology.
33For instance in quasi-linear settings with arbitrary small transfers.
22similarity is uniform over the levels of the belief hierarchy.34
De￿nition 10 A social choice function f : ￿ T ! A is continuously implementable w.r.t.
!U if there exists a mechanism M such that for any model T ￿ ￿ T , there is a Bayes Nash
equilibrium ￿ in the induced game U(M;T ) where for each ￿ t 2 ￿ T, (i) ￿(￿ t) is pure and (ii)
for any sequence t[n] !U ￿ t where for each n : t[n] 2 T; we have g ￿ ￿(t[n]) ! f(￿ t).
Recall that a pro￿le of strategies ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿I) is a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium in
U(M;T ) if for each i 2 I; and for each ti 2 Ti;
f￿i(ti)g = BRi(￿i(￿ j ti;￿￿i) j M).
We say that a social choice function f : ￿ T ! A is partially SNE-implementable if there ex-
ists a mechanism M and a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium ￿ in the induced game U(M; ￿ T )
where for each ￿ t 2 ￿ T, g ￿ ￿(￿ t) = f(￿ t). We can now state a simple su¢ cient condition for
continuous implementation w.r.t. uniform convergence.
Proposition 4 If f is partially SNE-implementable by a ￿nite mechanism then it is con-
tinuously implementable w.r.t. !U.
Proof. In the sequel, we use the following notations. For any i;￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti, and each k,
we note [￿ ti]k = f￿ t0
i 2 ￿ Ti : hk
i (￿ t0
i) = hk
i (￿ ti)g. We also note [￿ ti] for f￿ t0
i 2 ￿ Ti : hi(￿ t0
i) = hi(￿ ti)g.
In addition, given a model T = (T;￿) ￿ ￿ T , and any type ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti, we write Ck
￿(￿ ti) for the
set fti 2 Ti : hk
i (ti) 2 Bk
￿(hk
i (￿ ti))g where Bk
￿ is an open ball w.r.t. the distance dk de￿ned
over ￿(Xk￿1). In a similar way, C￿(￿ ti) denotes the set fti 2 Ti : hi(ti) 2 B￿(hi(￿ ti))g
where B￿ is an open ball w.r.t. the metric dU ￿ supk￿1 dk over T ￿
i . We will also use
the notation ￿ Ck
￿(￿ ti) for the set f￿ t0




i (￿ ti))g and ￿ C￿(￿ ti) for the set
f￿ t0
i 2 ￿ Ti : hi(￿ t0
i) 2 B￿(hi(￿ ti))g.
Lemma 2 Pick any model T = (T;￿) ￿ ￿ T . There exists ￿ ￿ > 0 such that for all ￿ < ￿ ￿,
all ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and ti 2 C￿(￿ ti) :
j ￿ti(f(￿;~ ￿
0
)g ￿ C￿(￿ t￿i)) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ti(f￿g ￿ [￿ t￿i]) j￿ ￿
for all ￿ t￿i 2 ￿ T￿i and ￿ 2 ￿.
Proof. For each i;ti 2 Ti, there exists a unique probability measure ￿ti 2 ￿(￿￿￿T ￿
￿i)
whose marginal ￿k
ti on Xk￿1 coincides with hk
i (ti) for each k ￿ 1. By de￿nition of the










￿i (￿ t￿i))) ￿ ￿; (2)
34Note that the topology of uniform convergence is an extension of notion of common p-belief (Monderer












￿i (￿ t￿i))) ￿ ￿; (3)
for each k, ￿ t￿i and ￿. (Where in the de￿nition of Prohorov metric, we respectively use as
Borel sets A = f(￿;~ ￿
0
)g￿hk￿1


















￿ (￿ t￿i)). Since ￿ T is ￿nite, there is K large enough so that for all k ￿ K;
￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and ￿ t￿i 2 ￿ T￿i : ￿ ￿￿ ti(f￿g￿[￿ t￿i]k￿1) = ￿ ￿￿ ti(f￿g￿[￿ t￿i]). Hence, for all k ￿ K; by (2) :
￿ ￿￿ ti(f￿g ￿ [￿ t￿i]) ￿ ￿ti(f(￿;~ ￿
0
)g ￿ Ck￿1
￿ (￿ t￿i)) ￿ ￿;
for each ￿ t￿i and ￿. Note that C￿(￿ t￿i) = \kCk
￿(￿ t￿i) and fCk
￿(￿ t￿i)gk is a decreasing sequence.






￿ (￿ t￿i)) = ￿ti(f(￿;~ ￿
0
)g ￿ \kCk￿1
￿ (￿ t￿i)) = ￿ti(f(￿;~ ￿
0
)g ￿ C￿(￿ t￿i)):
Thus, we have
￿ ￿￿ ti(f￿g ￿ [￿ t￿i]) ￿ ￿ti(f(￿;~ ￿
0
)g ￿ C￿(￿ t￿i)) ￿ ￿;
for all ￿ t￿i 2 ￿ T￿i and ￿.
Now, we have to show that for ￿ > 0 small enough, for each ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and ti 2 C￿(￿ ti) :
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ti(f￿g ￿ [￿ t￿i]) ￿ ￿ti(f(￿;~ ￿
0
)g ￿ C￿(￿ t￿i));
for all ￿ t￿i 2 ￿ T￿i and ￿ and the proof will be complete. By (3), we have for each ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti




￿ (￿ t￿i)) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ti(f￿g ￿ ￿ Ck￿1
2￿ (￿ t￿i)) ￿ ￿
for each k, ￿ t￿i 2 ￿ T￿i and ￿. Since ￿ T is ￿nite, we have that for ￿ small enough and k large
enough: ￿ Ck￿1




￿ (￿ t￿i)) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ti(f￿g ￿ [￿ t￿i]) ￿ ￿
for all ￿ t￿i 2 ￿ T￿i and ￿. Since C￿(￿ t￿i) ￿ Ck￿1
￿ (￿ t￿i) we have ￿ti(f(￿;~ ￿
0




￿ (￿ t￿i)), this yields the desired result.
Pick the ￿nite mechanism M under which there exists a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium
￿ ￿ in the induced game U(M; ￿ T ) where for each ￿ t 2 ￿ T, g￿￿ ￿(￿ t) = f(￿ t). Let us show that this
mechanism continuously implements f w.r.t. !U. Since ￿ ￿ is a strict Nash equilibrium and
the sets ￿ T, M and so by construction ￿￿ are ￿nite, we know that there exists ￿ " > 0 such
that for each i 2 I and each ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti;
f￿ ￿i(￿ ti)g = BRi(￿0
i j M). (4)
24whenever k￿0
i(￿) ￿ ￿i(￿ j ￿ ti; ￿ ￿￿i)k ￿ ￿ ".35
Consider the induced game U(M;T ) and build a modi￿ed game U￿(M;T ) where for
each player i, the set of strategies is restricted to
￿￿
i = f￿i : Ti ! ￿(Mi) j for all ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti; ￿i(ti) = ￿ ￿i(￿ ti) for all ti 2 C￿(￿ ti))g
where ￿ > 0 is assumed to be small.
Since M is ￿nite and T is countable, standard arguments show the existence of a Bayes
Nash equilibrium ￿ in U￿(M;T ). Note that for each ￿ t 2 ￿ T, (i) ￿(￿ t) = ￿ ￿(￿ t) since ￿ t 2 C￿(￿ t)
and so ￿(￿ t) is pure and (ii) for any sequence t[n] !U ￿ t where for each n : t[n] 2 T; we
have g ￿ ￿(t[n]) ! g ￿ ￿(￿ t) = f(￿ t) since t[n] 2 C￿(￿ t) for n large. Hence, it remains to
show that ￿ is an equilibrium of the original game U(M;T ). It is clear that whenever
ti = 2
[
￿ ti2 ￿ Ti
C￿(￿ ti) : mi 2 Supp(￿i(ti)) ) mi 2 BRi(￿i(￿ j ti;￿￿i) j M) since the set of
available actions is not modi￿ed for these types from U￿(M;T ) to U(M;T ). Now, pick
ti 2 Ti and ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti such that ti 2 C￿(￿ ti). Assuming ￿ is small enough, by Lemma 2 and
the construction of ￿￿
￿i, we obtain that k￿i(￿ j ti;￿￿i) ￿ ￿i(￿ j ￿ ti; ￿ ￿￿i)k ￿ ￿ " and so by (4),
playing ￿ ￿i(￿ ti) is the unique best reply. ￿
4.3 Ex ante approach vs. interim approach
In this article, we formalized the notion of proximity using the interim approach due to
Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) and the notion of type. In this approach, the modeler has in
mind a set of hierarchies of beliefs and is interested in the strategic behavior of any type
close to some type of the original model. It is possible to build another test of continuity
using the ex ante approach due to Kajii and Morris (1997) and the notion of model. We
brie￿ y expose in the following lines the ex ante approach for the simpli￿ed case in which
the initial model is a complete information one. While in our article types are de￿ned using
conditional beliefs, some speci￿cation of the prior distribution for each player is needed
to build a perturbation under the ex ante approach. More precisely, a perturbation will
be considered as close to the initial model if the set of types that are close to complete
information types (as de￿ned in our paper) has an ex ante probability that is close to
one. A social choice function is ex ante continuously implementable if in any perturbation
(arbitrarily) close to complete information, there is a Bayes Nash equilibrium such that
the social choice function is implemented with an (arbitrarily) high ex ante probability.
While this notion can be seen as less permissive than the one de￿ned in our paper, Oyama
and Tercieux (2005) have shown that the approach of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) and the
one of Kajii and Morris (1997) yield essentially the same qualitative results provided that
35Here we use the norm max, i.e:. k￿i(￿) ￿ ￿
0





25we allow players to have heterogenous prior beliefs. Hence, we believe that our results
would be maintained when considering ex ante continuous implementation if a common
prior is not assumed to hold. The characterization of ex ante continuous implementation
under the common prior assumption is an open question which is left for further research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2





Now we build the model ^ T = (^ T; ^ ￿) as follows. For each " 2 C, k, ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿, ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and
mi 2 Rk
i (￿ ti j M(￿ ￿); ￿ T ), we build inductively ^ ti[";k; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] and set
^ Ti =
[









i (￿ tijM(￿ ￿);￿ T )
^ ti[";k; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] [ Ti;
where Ti is de￿ned as in Proposition 1. Note that ^ Ti is countable.
In the sequel, we ￿x an arbitrary ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿. This equilibrium ￿ ￿ is sometimes omitted in
our notations.
We know that for each k; player i of type ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and mi 2 Rk
i (￿ ti j M(￿ ￿); ￿ T ), there
exists ￿
k;mi
￿ ti 2 ￿(￿ ￿ ￿ T￿i ￿ M￿i(￿ ￿)) such that
marg￿￿ ￿ T￿i ￿
k;mi
￿ ti = ￿ ￿￿ ti;
marg ￿ T￿i￿M￿i(￿ ￿) ￿
k;mi
￿ ti (￿ t￿i;m￿i) > 0 ) m￿i 2 Rk￿1
￿i (￿ t￿i j M(￿ ￿); ￿ T )
and
mi 2 BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i(￿ ￿) ￿
k;mi
￿ ti j M(￿ ￿)):
For ease of exposition, we sometimes consider ￿
k;mi
￿ ti as a measure over ￿ ￿ ￿ T￿i ￿ M￿i(￿ ￿)
and sometimes as a measure over ￿￿ ￿ ￿ T￿i ￿ M￿i(￿ ￿) assigning probability one on f~ ￿
0
g.
Similar abuses will be used throughout the proof.
First, we let ^ ti[";1; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] be such that ^ ￿^ ti[";1;￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] satis￿es the following two con-
ditions:
marg~ ￿ ^ ￿^ ti[";1;￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] = "￿~ ￿
mi + (1 ￿ ")￿~ ￿
0 (5)
where ￿x denotes the probability distribution that puts probability 1 on fxg. And,















stands for the preimage of the function ￿
";1
￿i : (￿;￿ t￿i;m￿i) 7￿! (￿;t￿i[￿ ￿;m￿i])
and t￿i[￿ ￿;m￿i] 2 T￿i is the type pro￿le de￿ned in Proposition 1. Recall that ￿￿i(t￿i[￿ ￿;m￿i]) =
26m￿i for any equilibrium ￿ in U(M;T ) s.t. ￿j ￿ T = ￿ ￿. Now for each k ￿ 2, de￿ne
^ ti[";k; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] inductively by
marg~ ￿ ^ ￿^ ti[";k;￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] = "￿~ ￿
mi + (1 ￿ ")￿~ ￿
0,
and,










￿i : (￿;￿ t￿i;m￿i) 7￿!
￿
￿;^ t￿i[";k ￿ 1; ￿ ￿;￿ t￿i;m￿i]
￿
.
Claim 3 For each ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and mi 2 R1
i (￿ ti j M(￿ ￿); ￿ T ) : ^ ti[1
k;k; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] !P ￿ ti as k ! 1.
To prove this claim we will use the following well-known lemma.
Lemma 3 (Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993))
Let T = (T;￿) be any model such that ￿￿ ￿ T is complete and separable and ￿ti is a con-
tinuous function of ti. Then, the mapping h : T ! T ￿ is continuous.
Proof of Claim 3. In the sequel, we will note ￿ h the (continuous) mapping that
projects ￿ T into T ￿ and, in a similar way, ^ h the (continuous) mapping from ^ T to T ￿.
For any ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and mi 2 Rk
i (￿ ti j M(￿ ￿); ￿ T ), since36 for all k ￿ 1 : ^ ti[";k; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] !
^ ti[0;k; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] as " ! 0, by Lemma 3, for all k ￿ 1 : ^ hk
i
￿





^ ti[0;k; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]
￿
as " ! 0.
Let us now show that for all k ￿ 1 and k0 ￿ k : ^ hk
i
￿
^ ti[0;k0; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]
￿
= ￿ hk
i (￿ ti) for all
￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and mi 2 Rk0
i (￿ ti j M(￿ ￿); ￿ T ). First notice that the ￿rst order beliefs are equal, i.e.
for all k0 ￿ 1; ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and mi 2 Rk0




^ ti[0;k0; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]
￿











￿ ti = marg￿ ￿ ￿￿ ti = ￿ h1
i(￿ ti)





Now ￿x some k ￿ 2 and let L be the set of all belief pro￿les of players other than i at
order k￿1. Toward an induction, assume that for all k0 ￿ k￿1 : ^ hk￿1
j (^ tj[0;k0; ￿ ￿;￿ tj;mj]) =
36A type in ^ Ti is either in Ti ￿which is endowed with the discrete topology, say ￿Ti ￿or it is in ^ TinTi.
Any point in ^ TinTi is identi￿ed with an element of the set C ￿N￿ ￿ ￿￿Mi where N; ￿ ￿;Mi are all endowed
with the discrete topology while C is endowed with the usual topology on R induced on C. Finally,
C ￿ N ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Mi is endowed with the product topology; call this topology ￿ ^ TinTi. The topology over ^ Ti is
the coarsest topology that contains ￿Ti [ ￿ ^ TinTi. It can easily be checked that under such a topology, ^ T
satis￿es the conditions of Lemma 3.
27￿ hk￿1
j (￿ tj) for each j, ￿ tj 2 ￿ Tj and mj 2 Rk0
j (￿ tj j M(￿ ￿); ￿ T ). Then for all k0 ￿ k : proj￿￿L ￿ ￿




￿i = proj￿￿L ￿
￿
id￿ ￿ ￿ h￿i ￿ idM￿i(￿ ￿)
￿
where id￿ (resp. idM￿i(￿ ￿)) is the
identity mapping from ￿ to ￿ (resp. from M￿i(￿ ￿) to M￿i(￿ ￿)) while proj￿￿L (resp.
proj￿￿L) is the projection mapping from ￿ ￿ T ￿ to ￿ ￿ L (resp. from ￿ ￿ T ￿ ￿ M￿i(￿ ￿)
to ￿ ￿ L); hence for all k0 ￿ k; ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and mi 2 Rk0
i (￿ ti j M(￿ ￿); ￿ T ) :
marg￿￿L ^ ￿^ ti[0;k0;￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] ￿
￿











































id￿ ￿ ￿ h￿i ￿ idM￿i(￿ ￿)
￿￿1
= marg￿￿L ￿ ￿￿ ti ￿
￿




i (^ ti[0;k0; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]) = ￿^ hk￿1
i (^ ti[0;k0;￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]) ￿ marg￿￿L ^ ￿^ ti[0;k0;￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] ￿
￿
id￿ ￿ ^ h￿i
￿￿1
= ￿￿ hk￿1
i (￿ ti) ￿ marg￿￿L ￿ ￿￿ ti ￿
￿
id￿ ￿ ￿ h￿i
￿￿1 = ￿ hk
i (￿ ti)
showing that ^ hk
i (^ ti[0;k0; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]) = ￿ hk
i (￿ ti). Thus, we have proved that for all k ￿ 1,
all k0 ￿ k : ^ hk
i
￿
^ ti[";k0; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]
￿
! ￿ hk
i (￿ ti) as " ! 0 for any ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and mi 2 Rk0
i (￿ ti j




k0;k0; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]
￿
! ￿ hk
i (￿ ti) as k0 ! 1 for
any ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and mi 2 R1
i (￿ ti j M(￿ ￿); ￿ T ) as claimed.
Claim 4 For each k, ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and mi 2 R1
i (￿ ti j M(￿ ￿); ￿ T ), we have: ￿i(^ ti[1
k;k; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]) =
mi for any equilibrium ￿ of U(M; ^ T ) satisfying ￿j ￿ T = ￿ ￿.
Proof. Fix a type ￿ ti 2 ￿ Ti and an equilibrium ￿ of U(M; ^ T ) satisfying ￿j ￿ T = ￿ ￿. We
will show by induction on k that for all " > 0 and k ￿ 1: ￿i(^ ti[";k; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]) = mi for all
message mi 2 Rk
i (￿ ti j M(￿ ￿); ￿ T ).
Recall that, by construction, for all mi 2 Mi(￿ ￿) : ti[￿ ￿;mi] 2 Ti is the type in Proposi-
tion 1 such that ￿i(ti[￿ ￿;mi]) = mi. First, ￿x " > 0 and mi 2 R1
i(￿ ti j M(￿ ￿); ￿ T ) and let us
prove that ￿i(^ ti[";1; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]) = mi. For each ^ ti[";1; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]; de￿ne the belief
￿
";1
i = ^ ￿^ ti[";1;￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] ￿ ￿￿1 2 ￿(￿￿ ￿ ^ T￿i ￿ M￿i)
where ￿ : (￿￿;t￿i[￿ ￿;m￿i]) 7! (￿￿;t￿i[￿ ￿;m￿i];m￿i). Note that by construction, ￿
";1
i is the
belief of type ^ ti[";1; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] on ￿￿￿ ^ T￿i￿M￿i when he believes that m￿i is played at each
(￿￿;t￿i[￿ ￿;m￿i]). Hence, for each " ￿ 0, ￿
";1
i corresponds to beliefs of type ^ ti[";1; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]
28when the equilibrium ￿ is played. Now, by Equations (5) and (6), the belief ￿
0;1
i of type
^ ti[0;1; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] satis￿es
marg￿￿￿M￿i ￿
0;1









￿1 = marg￿￿￿M￿i ￿
1;mi
￿ ti
where ￿￿ : (￿;t￿i[￿ ￿;m￿i]) 7! (￿;~ ￿
0
;t￿i[￿ ￿;m￿i];m￿i). Since Supp(￿i(^ ti[0;1; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi])) ￿
BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i ￿
0;1
i j M); we have: BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i ￿
1;mi
￿ ti j M) 6= ;. In addition,
since marg￿￿￿M￿i ￿
1;mi
￿ ti (￿ ￿ f~ ￿
0
g ￿ M￿i(￿ ￿)) = 1; by construction of Mi(￿ ￿) we have
BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i ￿
1;mi
￿ ti j M) ￿ Mi(￿ ￿). Thus,
BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i ￿
1;mi
￿ ti j M(￿ ￿)) = BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i ￿
1;mi
￿ ti j M):
Recall that, by construction of ￿
1;mi
￿ ti , mi 2 BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i ￿
1;mi
￿ ti j M(￿ ￿)). Conse-
quently,
mi 2 BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i ￿
0;1
i j M):
In addition, we have
marg￿￿M￿i ￿
";1
i = marg￿￿M￿i ￿
0;1
i .
Hence, for " > 0; by construction of ￿
";1
i ; fmig = BRi(marg￿￿￿M￿i ￿
";1
i j M) and
￿i(^ ti[";1; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]) = mi.
Now, for each k ￿ 2; proceed by induction and assume that ￿￿i(^ t￿i[";k￿1; ￿ ￿;￿ t￿i;m￿i]) =
m￿i for any ￿ t￿i 2 ￿ T￿i, m￿i 2 Rk￿1
￿i (￿ t￿i j M(￿ ￿); ￿ T ) and " > 0. Now ￿x " > 0 and
mi 2 Rk
i (￿ ti j M(￿ ￿); ￿ T ). For each ^ ti[";k; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]; de￿ne the belief
￿
";k
i = ^ ￿^ ti[";k;￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] ￿ ￿￿1
k 2 ￿(￿￿ ￿ ^ T￿i ￿ M￿i)
where ￿k : (￿￿;^ t￿i[";k ￿ 1; ￿ ￿;￿ t￿i;m￿i]) 7! (￿￿;^ t￿i[";k ￿ 1; ￿ ￿;￿ t￿i;m￿i];m￿i).
Note that, by construction, ￿
";k
i is the belief of type ^ ti[";k; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi] on ￿￿￿ ^ T￿i￿M￿i
when he believes that m￿i is played at each (￿￿;^ t￿i[";k ￿ 1; ￿ ￿;￿ t￿i;m￿i]). Hence, by the
induction hypothesis, for each " ￿ 0, ￿
";k
i corresponds to beliefs of type ^ ti[";k; ￿ ￿;￿ ti;mi]
when the equilibrium ￿ is played. The end of the proof mimics the case k = 1.
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